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Abstract

Germany’s position of power within the European Union disguises how impacted the
German economy was by the 2008 Financial Crisis and Europe’s subsequent Sovereign
Debt Crisis. Two of Germany’s major banks-Commerzbank and Bayerische
Landesbank- suffered major losses and required emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to
survive. Walter Bagehot wrote the theory underpinning lenders of last resort (LLRs) in
1873 but how has the development of systemically important banks affected the
usefulness of Bagehot’s theory? This paper aims to explain why Germany is in need of
updated LLR recommendations through an analysis of the ELA Germany at large,
Commerzbank and Bayerische Landesbank received. It also aims to empirically prove
the stigma and public distrust of ELA through a regression of Commerzbank’s daily
stock returns using an augmented Fama/French model. I find that Bagehot’s theory and
recommendations are out of date for our current global financial sector. I cannot
empirically prove any stigma or public distrust of Commerzbank, there is no relationship
between Commerzbank stock returns and the augmented Fama/French factors.
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I. Introduction
Germany has been viewed increasingly as the driving force behind the EU debt
negotiations with good reason; Germans appear to be footing a disproportionate amount
of the bill. To many onlookers Germany, and German banks, escaped the Financial
Crisis unscathed. As Greece’s continuing debt crisis covered international news,
Germany was consistently painted as the unsympathetic aggressor. In everyday
conversation it sounded like Germany did not face any obstacles to recovery, or even
need a recovery at all. In reality, however, Germany suffered like every other nation and
similarly its banks also required liquidity assistance. But how well did Germany disburse
additional funds for liquidity assistance during this crisis?
Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market in
1873 in response to recent financial panics in London and the United Kingdom
(UK). His frequently quoted book articulates what a Lender of Last Resort (LLR) is,
who should take on that role and what they should do in the role. It became the standard
theory behind LLRs despite how long ago it was written. Using his recommendations I
will look at how liquidity assistance was provided to Germany as a whole through the
European Central Bank (ECB). Taking into account the approval process for liquidity
assistance, the type of liquidity assistance provided and, any collateral requirements, I
will be analyzing if the ECB adhered to Bagehot’s recommendations both to the letter
and in spirit. Within Germany itself, many individual banks required and applied for
liquidity assistance. I will be looking at two specific banks: Commerzbank and
Bayerische Landesbank to see a snapshot of how Germany provided assistance to its own
banks. Using the same analytic tools listed above, I will be analyzing whether Germany
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followed Bagehot’s recommendations when providing assistance to its own banks. These
two banks are being chosen because of their importance to Germany’s economy and the
scope of funds they received. Finally, I will be running an event study on the ELA
Commerzbank received to contextualize Bagehot’s recommendation in a modern crisis.
Commerzbank is Germany’s second largest private bank. It is truly global in
scope, with numerous offshore branches, representatives in 50 countries across the globe,
thousands of employees and over €500 billion of assets. A bank of this size and
importance in Germany, and the world, will greatly affect the global economy if it suffers
from a liquidity or solvency problem. Given the trend of increasing bank size and
influence, and the new idea of banks being too systemically important to fail,
Commerzbank can be seen as “too big to fail” in the German financial system.
Bayerische Landesbank is Germany’s eighth largest financial institution and is
now almost entirely owned by the state of Bavaria. Bavaria has the largest economy of
any state in Germany, making it a wealthy region. Bayerische Landesbank holds over
€200 billion in assets. While Bayerische Landesbank is a private bank, its unique status
as a Landesbank, state owned, means that the taxpayers of Bavaria can be liable for
providing bailout funds similar to how the United States provided bailouts following
Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Bayerische Landesbank is a large German bank with a farreaching global impact. Continued confidence in Bayerische Landesbank is important for
the continued growth of Bavaria’s and the larger German economy.
Not only is Germany seen as being too efficient and effective to allow its banks to
face these situations, the conversation around systemically important banks seems to be
primarily a U.S. conversation. This is overwhelmingly false. Despite Germany being a
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major financial hub for the European and world financial system, it faced many of the
same problems and may have given special treatment to its most influential institutions.
Throughout the world, central, public and private banks faced major liquidity
crises following the bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble and the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Europe faced an additional Sovereign Debt Crisis
during and after the 2008 Financial Crisis; my analysis will focus on this period, 2010 to
present. This paper will investigate to what extent the implementation of ELA funds in
Germany followed the recommendations presented by Walter Bagehot and whether the
discovery of systemically important banks was relevant to the dispersal of
funds. Germany’s position of power in the European Union may have allowed it to
inefficiently allocate emergency funds without following Bagehot’s recommendations
and not face any international outcry or consequences.
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II. Lit Review
The economic literature on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and lenders of last
resort (LLRs) is vast; a search for academic articles on JSTOR had over one hundred and
seventy thousand results. Unfortunately, literature on individual countries and their
approach was more difficult to find. The following papers have provided a strong
starting point; the first three cover my area of interest and provide an example of
empirical evaluation. The fourth paper reviewed provided background on data sets for
my empirical analysis. The fifth and final piece of literature reviewed is Bagehot’s last
chapter. It is one of the foundational sources on ELA and LLRs. Every paper I reviewed
referenced Bagehot in some aspect and facilitates a jumping off point for my own
analysis.
The first paper, “Financial Crises and Bank Funding: Recent Experience in the
Euro Area” (2013), has Adrian van Rixtel and Gabriele Gasperini arguing three main
points. First that banks turned towards secured liabilities, and reduced their unsecured
liabilities and securitizations during the crisis. They argue that this is due to a change in
what the European Central Bank and sovereign national banks would accept as collateral.
Second, funding from sovereign central banks and the European Central Bank
(ECB)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) was crucial in stabilizing the Euroarea during
the height of the Financial Crisis following the failure of Lehman Brothers and again
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. They claim that every bank in the Euroarea
had difficulties with funding, whether in access or cost and “thus sovereign tensions
morphed into a banking crisis”. Without access to short term funding available in the
market setting, banks were forced to turn to Lenders of Last Resort (LLRs). Lenders of

German ELA in Crisis

Gillenwater 8

Last Resort are where banks can find liquidity if there is none available in the market.
They are seen as the “last resort” because that liquidity comes at a price.
Their third argument, that funding was increasingly segmented according to bank
nationality and that access to funding was no longer due to their credit worthiness but
offered primarily on the basis of their country of origin. Their most convincing data
points for this argument were in the data for deposit funding. Peripheral countries
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain) suffered from deposit outflows while core countries
(France, Germany, Netherlands and Italy) witnessed deposit inflows. Rixtel and
Gasperini mention that outflows from Greece, Portugal and Spain were not driven
entirely by depositors seeking a safe haven but by depositors wanting access to funds
during an economic downturn. This also speaks to a lack of confidence in the stability of
the local banking systems; depositors were worried that they will not have access to their
funds if they are kept in their local bank. France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands
received an increase of €296, €265, €203 and €57 billion euros respectively.
Despite the cause of deposit inflows and outflows, the unique structure of the EU
meant that banks with large liquidity and funding difficulties were tied to their nation’s
central bank for the LLR and ELA functions. The EU required that the central bank of
the country in question was solely responsible for providing all ELA and assumed all the
risk for each bank within that country. Not all countries’ central banks had the ability to
provide liquidity to their struggling banking sector1 and forced banks to look for other
means of funding.

1

Any country within the European Monetary Union is no longer able to print their own
money or create their own monetary policy. By adopting the euro, these countries ceded
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Rixtel and Gasperini argue that the increased dependence on interbank borrowing
emphasized and demonstrated the segmentation of available financing across national
lines. The transformation of Germany into a net lender for Euroarea banks (after being a
consistent borrower) demonstrates that Germany was flush with funding while many
other Euro banks (namely those Italy and Spain) were desperate for funding and were net
borrowers. They conclude the paper reiterating the strong connection between financial
crises and bank funding because during periods of extreme financial turmoil access to
funding markets becomes strained and forces all banks to find alternative funding sources
or decrease their holdings. They explain how this harms the overall economy and end
with “the principle that fiscal prudence is a prerequisite for bank stability.”
Of the three main points made in this paper, I find the third one most interesting
and relevant to the scope of my paper. The first argument that banks turned towards
securitized liabilities is well supported with empirical evidence; you see a drop in
uncovered bonds across the Euroarea. Their second argument, funding from LLRs and
the ECB/IMF was crucial in stabilizing the Euroarea, is hard to dispute. But the third
argument, that funding was segmented across national lines, is interesting and not
necessarily logical. The evidence Rixtel and Gasperini present is convincing, but
simplistic. They ignore the number of multinational banks present in the
Euroarea. Many large banks may be headquartered in one Euroarea country but have
branches, which provide loans, in multiple other countries. They also ignore banks that
have ownership in multiple countries. Italian banks have subsidiaries in France; Dutch
banks have majority ownership from German shareholders. This paper provides a strong
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argument for the importance of the nationality of a bank but it lacks a critical
complication, cross-national banks.

In the second paper, “Central Banks as Lenders of Last Resort: Experiences
During the 2007-10 Crisis and Lessons for the Future”, Dietrich Domanski, Richhild
Moessner and William Nelson (2014) review Bagehot’s classical theory of LLRs, explain
how ELA was dispersed during the crisis and finish the paper with recommendations for
ELA policy in the future. The theory for LLRs centers on providing liquidity to solvent
but illiquid banks at a penalty rate to discourage moral hazard with sufficient
collateral. ELA should either be provided to prevent a disorderly bankruptcy and fire
sale or, to the market as a whole via open market operations. The LLRs should use
constructive ambiguity to avoid moral hazard, the LLR manages market expectations so
no bank knows for sure if it will receive ELA and that reduces moral hazard.
The authors then describe how ELA was given during the crisis and the many
different institutions created to manage liquidity. In the first phase of the crisis ELA was
used primarily to “allow an orderly resolution of liquidity difficulties of financial
institutions that were perceived as systemically important.” Following the fall of Lehman
Brothers2, they argue that ELA expanded dramatically and not always in line with the
theory of ELA. LLRs broadened the list of acceptable collateral, provided ELA in
foreign currencies and extended the maturity of loans.
2

Lehman Brothers, the large American investment bank, filled for bankruptcy on
September 15th, 2008 after the Federal Reserve denied Lehman Brothers ELA. Lehman
filling for bankruptcy started the ripple effect of the Financial Crisis. A number of
international firms held securities interrelated to Lehman Brothers in some manner so the
collapse and subsequent bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers caused a $737 billion decline in
collateral for the securities lending market (Aitken & Singh, 2009).
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Domanski et al. argue that although the practice of ELA violated the theory, the
actions of LLRs were in the spirit of the theory. The LLRs acted to avoid the costly
failure of institutions and limit the risk of contagion. Domanski et al. feel that ELA was
often riskier than normal lending; LLRs increased moral hazard by providing ELA to
non-traditional institutions. Central banks needed to find new strategies to handle
liquidity problems outside of the banking sector, the new ELA provisions required central
banks to make tough choices about drawing boundaries and most importantly, the stigma
associated with receiving ELA was increased.
Domanski et al. end the paper with a review of policy changes that have been
implemented following the crisis and a recommendation for more improvements. New
liquidity regulations aim to reduce the need for ELA, the perimeter of regulation has been
increased to include institutions that can cause system-wide shocks from liquidity
problems and new policy initiatives that internalize the effects of excessive risk-taking to
reduce moral hazard are in the works. The recommendations Domanski et al. make focus
on changing the role of the central bank, using discretion for foreign currencies and,
reducing the stigma associated with ELA.
The major arguments made in this paper, that the LLRs followed the spirit of
ELA theory and the policy recommendations, seems possible. Whether the LLRs
followed the theory of ELA as described by Bagehot, they still provided ELA to many
institutions in a variety of ways. But they make an interesting observation. The
Eurozone was able to give more ELA in a more effective manner because they had
reduced the stigma associated with ELA. This paper provides an unconsidered avenue
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for further discussion: How did the Eurozone reduce stigma and was it consistent within
and throughout countries?

The third paper, “Did Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) of the ECB Delay
the Bankruptcy of Greek Banks?” features Martin R. Gotz, Rainer Haselmann, Jan Pieter
Krahnen and Sascha Steffen (2015) explaining the process of receiving ELA in the
Eurozone, examining the decision to give Greece ELA and making recommendations for
ways to improve ELA in the Eurozone. They lay out the conflict between the national
central banks providing ELA but needing approval for ELA allocations from the
European Central Bank (ECB)’s Council of Governors. This need for approval, they
argue, makes the decision to provide additional funding and liquidity for a country in a
time of crisis dependent on a consensus of European policy makers. Ultimately, they
argue, “the assessment of a nation[al] bank’s solvency is intertwined with the decision at
the higher level”.
Gotz et al. then claim that Greece was solvent according to the data they had
available and that the ECB had no other decision than to extend the ELA until a decision
was made at the “supra-national” level. The main recommendation from this paper was
the need for increased transparency and availability of Eurozone ELA data. They argue
that the market responds primarily to speculation because factual evidence is unavailable
and the speculation is harmful to the market. Gotz et al. provide a country-specific
method of analysis for Eurozone ELA. So despite the lack of investigable questions, this
paper is infinitely useful to me as the main analysis of this paper is a single country.
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The fourth paper reviewed for this thesis, “Fama/French Factors for Germany:
Which Set is Best?” has Roman Brückner, Patrick Lehmann, Martin H. Schmidt and
Richard Stehle discuss internet-based data sets from 6 different authors: Artmann, Finter,
Kempf, Koch and Theissen (2012b), Hanauer, Kaserer and Rapp (2013), Schmidt,
Schrimpf, von Arx, Wagner and Zeigler (2011), Marmi and Poma, Frazzini and
themselves. In total, they analyze nine different factor set for Germany and three time
series. They highlight differences in makeup of the data sets, compare the datasets
empirically and give advice on when to use which data set.
The factor sets differ on their data sources, the included stock exchanges, the
breakpoints and sample selection of the portfolios, the treatment of dual class firms, the
tax imputations system, the rate of return on the market portfolio and a few other minor
characteristics. There are three major data sources Stehle’s database of the Frankfurt
stock exchange beginning in 1954, Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank (KKMDB) and
DataStream; however, each author uses a slightly different data source. Artmann et al.
use KKMDB and Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienfuhrer, Brückner et al. use a number of
sources including KKMDB and DataStream, Franzzini uses CRSP and XpressFeed
Global, Hanauer et al. and Schmidt et al. use DataStream and Worldscope, Marmi and
Poma use Factset.
The included stock exchanges for each author are predominantly the Frankfurt
stock exchange but Franzzini’s stock exchanges are unknown and Schmidt et al.’s are
listed as “probably all”. The ‘Small Minus Big’ (SMB) factor is calculated by
subtracting the rate of return on large stocks from the rate of return on small stocks, so
the breakpoint for small and large stocks is essential. There are three major choices, a
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50/50 break (which Hanauer et al. and Artmann et al. use), Schmidt et al. use both
breakpoints of 0.5 and 0.8 and Franzzini only uses a breakpoint of 0.8. Except Hanauer
et al., all of the factor sets reviewed use separate (typically larger) samples of stocks for
the calculation of the market portfolio than the factor portfolios.
The authors review three different methods for handling the dual class of stock
issued by firms. The two classes, Stammaktien (common stocks) and Vorzugsaktien
(non-voting preferred stock), can be treated as a unit, two separate observations, or only
one type can be included. Brückner et al. and Hanauer et al. use the first method,
Armann et al. includes the class of stock with the longer availability of data, Schmidt et
al., Frazzini and, Marmi and Poma remove non-voting shares. Brückner et al. are the
only factor set to take the corporate income tax credit into account. All factor sets, except
Artmann et al., calculate their own proxy for the market portfolio from their own
sample. Artmann et al., uses DAFOX until 2004 and the CDAX starting in 2005.
Following their description of the factors sets individual characteristics, the
authors then move to compare the factor sets empirically. They look at the number of
observations in the portfolios, the means and standard deviations stability over time, the
correlation coefficients and tests of means, and any economically significant
differences. Brückner et al. conclude the paper reviewing applications of the factor sets
and making recommendations based on proposed use of the factor sets.
This paper was essential to my statistical analysis section. Fama/French factors
are easily available for America and there is only one factor set, but as Brückner et al.
make clear Germany is not the same. Brückner et al.’s in depth comparison for a number
of factor sets was invaluable. My major critique for this paper is that it reads often like
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self-promotion. They highlight a number of key differences and through their own
analysis but they only recommend three other factor sets besides their own (two of them
with time constraints). The self-promotion however, was successful in this case because
I use Brückner et al.’s factor set.

The final piece of literature reviewed is the famed chapter seven: “A More Exact
Account of the Mode in Which the Bank of England Has Discharged Its Duty of
Retaining a Good Bank Reserve, and of Administering It Effectually,” from Walter
Bagehot’s book Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Bagehot (1873)
argues for a LLR’s existence and how it should function. He begins the chapter
explaining how the Bank of England (BoE) was not meant to hold excess stock or
become an LLR3. There is no legal justification for the BoE to have gained and
continued this duty.
He continues by describing the crisis of 1864 and how the BoE responded to the
crisis. Bagehot quotes the Governor of the Bank (Mr. Hankey) who praises BoE’s ability
to easily lend funds to all who ask. Bagehot praises the decision for the BoE to hold the
excess reserves in the system. He views it as critical that only one bank has this function
and that it is clearly stated which bank holds this function. Bagehot quotes Mr. Hankey’s
response to The Economist where Mr. Hankey lays out the basic functions of a
LLR. Bagehot’s largest complaint on Hankey’s response was the assumption that BoE
kept very large emergency funds at all times. Bagehot (1873) explains, “'fresh money'

3

The Bank of England was not meant to have extra funds (stock) that were not being lent
out to other businesses or individuals to make a profit for the bank. When other banks
were short on necessary funds they could turn to BoE and receive some of its extra funds.
Thus a lender of last resort was born.
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could not be borrowed, even on the best security—even on Consols except at the Bank of
England. There was no other lender to new borrowers.” Bagehot is arguing that the LLR
must be an institution that has the ability to create new credit and new money. In a true
panic, even the largest of reserves will not be enough.
Following his critique of Hankey’s response Bagehot advocates for a clear policy
from the BoE to be announced so that the public knows what to expect. He insults the
board of the BoE claiming, “they are a board of plain, sensible, prosperous English
merchants.” He quotes two Bank directors and then immediately disagrees with what
they are saying. Bagehot lists some instances of panic, the total bank reserves at that time
and how those reserves impacted the money market to show how critical a strong
emergency reserve is to the success of the economy of England.
Bagehot spends a lot of the chapter convincing the reader that holding and lending
an emergency reserve is the most critical job of the BoE. He explains:
The keepers of the Banking reserve, whether one or many, are obliged then to
use that reserve for their own safety. If they permit all other forms of credit to
perish, their own will perish immediately, and in consequence.
As to the Bank of England, however, this is denied. It is alleged that the Bank of
England can keep aloof in a panic; that it can, if it will, let other banks and trades
fail; that if it chooses, it can stand alone, and survive intact while all else perishes
around it.
He argues that without spending the reserve there are no other forms of credit available to
anyone and the entire economy will dry up. The BoE allowing all other forms of credit to
perish would nowadays mean the interbank lending market and commercial paper market
are at a standstill. Claiming that the BoE itself would perish is a bold statement, but if
they have allowed all other forms of credit to be used without contributing, BoE will need
an enormous amount of reserves released into the economy simultaneously to have a
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chance of restarting that economy. Especially because “in a panic there is no new money
to be had; everybody who has it clings to it, and will not part with it”. Bagehot goes
through an elaborate explanation for why keeping extensive reserves is crucial to the
wellbeing of the economy. This hinges on the idea that there is no new money. A bank
cannot count on repaid liabilities to fund the reserves because no one is repaying their
liabilities, nor can they sell stock or equity because there is no one willing to part with
their liquid money to purchase them.
Bagehot ends the chapter with some tidbits of wisdom and advice for all banks
potentially facing a panic in their economies. He opens with:
And for the Bank of England, as with other Banks in the same case, these
advances, if they are to be made at all, should be made so as if possible to obtain
the object for which they are made. The end is to stay the panic; and the advances
should, if possible, stay the panic.
Bagehot is now using the experience of Bank of England and the number of panics that it
had survived to extrapolate recommendations for how all LLRs can also survive any
future panics and sustain their economies.
The two big takeaways are “that these loans should only be made at a very high
rate of interest… these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as
largely the public ask for them”. The high rate of interest “operate as a heavy fine on
unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons
who do not require it”. Meaning that only banks that really need the credit will apply for
loans, and they will apply immediately because the longer they wait the higher the
interest rate. The advances are made freely to “stay alarm, and nothing therefore should
be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse someone who has good
security to offer”. The idea being as long as there are loans being given to these banks
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then there cannot be any major problem with them. The advances are given on good
securities because “no advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately
lose”.
Bagehot argues that his recommendations are relevant and important because he
sees lending reserves as the best way to get out of a panic, “this is the method of making
its money go the farthest, and of enabling it to get through the panic if anything will so
enable it.” He claims, “making no loans as we have seen will ruin it; making large loans
and stopping, as we have also seen, will ruin it”. Basically the idea he is presenting is
best because the other examples he provided have resulted in failure. The evidence he
provides is analysis of The Bank of England in various panics in the mid-late nineteenth
century, 1847, 1857 and 1866. He is surprisingly positive in his critique of bank
procedures with one major caveat: the BoE must be more upfront and honest about how
much credit it is willing to loan and on what security it will be made. He feels this will
greatly decrease any panic because there will be confidence in the Bank and its actions.
Given the degree to which I will be discussing Bagehot’s recommendations in the
rest of this paper, I will keep my comments here to a minimum. The greatest potential
for Bagehot to be considered no longer relevant to our economy comes from the changes
in the world’s economy since Bagehot published his book. Bagehot wrote about a single
country, and panics that affected primarily that country. While England was arguably the
strongest country in the world at the time of publication, its economy was much closer to
being protected from attacks from the outside than any major country is now. The world
did not have a “world economy” or a technology driven economy in the same sense that
we do now. While there were international companies and banks, the world of
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international finance has only gotten more complex and intertwined as time passed. The
arguments that Bagehot makes and the recommendations he gives are very logical and
well backed in the evidence he provides, but the world he is describing is dated and no
longer in existence. This is the question I will spend the rest of the paper discussing, do
his ideas still hold true in our modern, complicated and globalized financial system?
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III. Literature Analysis
In traditional economic theory Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market by
Walter Bagehot is the original word on the concept of Lenders of Last Resort
(LLRs). Bagehot’s writings in the nineteenth century still shape how modern economists
evaluate LLRs. According to Bagehot (1873), in a financial panic “the holders of the
ultimate Bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to all that bring good
securities quickly, freely, and readily.” The “holders of ultimate bank reserves” are the
bank(s) most easily equipped to provide large sums of currency without constraints. This
typically falls on the central banking system (the banks able to directly enact monetary
policy) because of its ability to print and create currency, but any bank with a large
reserve of cash could fulfill this role. Critically Bagehot (1873) believes the holder of
reserves “should lend to all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily”. In
other words, the LLRs should have funds easily available for any institution that can
provide acceptable collateral. He complicates this standard by adding two rules:
First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This
will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest
number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised
early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out
of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be
protected as far as possible.
Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking
securities, and as largely as the public ask for them.
These two rules function to penalize banks from unnecessarily seeking liquidity while
providing a sense of security to the market as a whole because the LLR is carrying on as
usual.
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The problems of these rules are twofold; first, the high rate of interest Bagehot is
advocating for will only worsen the liquidity problems for a bank. It is seeking excess
funds because it cannot make current payments on the liabilities it already holds,
charging a high rate of interest will discourage many banks from seeking excess liquidity
because they cannot afford the interest and will further penalize and jeopardize banks that
are facing a serious liquidity crisis. Bagehot avoids this dilemma by assuming a
separating equilibrium for the banks pursuing liquidity assistance. There are two
categories of banks, solvent but illiquid and insolvent. The LLR must choose which bank
to provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to but the LLR does not want to give
ELA to an insolvent bank. The “penalty rate” interest rate ideally discourages insolvent
banks from applying for ELA because the high interest rate will be impossible for
insolvent banks to repay. Theoretically this reveals which banks are only illiquid because
they will be the only banks applying for ELA from the LLRs. The insolvent banks will
just fail.
The problem with assuming a separating equilibrium is that you assume banks,
and bankers, would not try to game the system and that situations are static. As the
Financial Crisis bled into the Sovereign Debt Crisis and just kept getting worse, it seemed
that every financial institution was having difficulties meeting its solvency
requirements. That is not to say that every institution was insolvent or even close to it,
but there definitely were banks, and countries, disguising the magnitude of their financial
woes. Many banks, and bankers, are incentivized to end the quarter on a high. They are
motivated to hide how dire the situation really is until the latest round of bonuses have
been approved or the first LLR agrees to provide ELA. Due to the chaos of the global
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financial sector, LLRs were looking to each other as signaling devices for solvent and
trustworthy banks. Once ELA was available from one source, ELA from many other
sources would then become available.
As Domanski et al (2014) explained, approval of European Central Bank (ECB)
emergency funds requires approval of the EU Board of Governors. This approval process
inherently ties the analysis of bank solvency to approval of the government in
charge. Given the strict requirements for government deficits and liquidity of financial
institutions, EU countries had a strong incentive to lie about the true nature of their
financial troubles. Violation of the Maastricht Treaty4 could lead to not only a loss of
ELA access but potentially to exit from the Eurozone as a whole. Governors from each
country also had an incentive to please the other Governors if they knew their country
would be asking for funds eventually.
Trying to keep in a country’s good graces and keep up appearances violates
Bagehot’s assumption of a separating equilibrium. The moment a country is more
concerned with being seen as solvent the incentive to remain truthful shifts. The
politicized nature of ELA approval means that appearances are crucial for the survival of
an EU country’s economy. While this could work in favor of the separating equilibrium,
countries may be more willing to let some banks fail because they do not want to be seen
as asking too much from the ECB. The ECB also has an incentive to keep all of its major
banks afloat. Insolvency and failure of a major EU bank would drastically reduce the
confidence in the European banking and finance system.

4

The Maastricht Treaty officially established the European Union in 1993. Included in
the Treaty were a number of fiscal requirements including limiting debt to 60% of GDP
and no annual deficits greater than 3% of GDP.

German ELA in Crisis

Gillenwater 23

This means the ECB has a large incentive to only approve funding for banks that
are simply illiquid, but once ECB has approved funding for a bank they are very
motivated to keep providing liquidity and credit until the entire panic is over and the bank
is solvent again. No one, especially not a large and important central bank, wants to be
seen making a mistake when providing funding and rescuing banks. The interconnected
nature of the global economy now means that changes in one area of the world affect all
economies. When Bagehot was writing the English economy was much more protected
from shocks in the rest of the world.
Secondly, there is a lot of confusion and debate on what qualifies as “good
banking securities”. At the peak of the bubble many more things may count as a good
security than during the panic and liquidity crisis following the burst of the bubble. In
fact, a bank facing a liquidity crisis may have many securities in its book that can no
longer be defined as a good security and keep a bank that needs liquidity assistance from
receiving it. Bagehot (1873) clarifies his definition of a good security as one that “in
ordinary times is reckoned a good security” but this does not solve the problem. Banks
that are severely affected by a liquidity crisis are also probably the banks holding the
highest number of securities that no one views in “ordinary times” as good.
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis and its ongoing recovery, the provision of
ELA funds has been scrutinized. The Eurozone provided a lot of liquidity to its member
countries through each country’s central bank. As Domanski et al (2014) explains the
funds were dispensed through a variety of methods including; central bank swap lines,
extending credit to prevent failure of systematically important institutions, stepping into
“malfunctioning interbank markets” and, providing funding to increase liquidity in
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specific markets. They (2014) continue, the ECB provided ELA to “a much broader
range of counterparties and against a broad range of collateral”. The Eurozone
participated in exceptional long-term open market operations to solve shortage of term
funding problems, and central bank swap lines to solve a shortage of reserves in foreign
currencies. In late 2008 the ECB basically established a fully elastic supply of central
bank reserves by moving to refinancing more banks with looser collateral standards at
fixed rates.
The ECB dramatically increased what assets it was willing to accept as collateral
and Germany followed suit by creating new liquidity providing programs. In 2008 it
began accepting temporarily illiquid assets, especially asset backed securities (ABS),
instead of liquid collateral. Domanski et al. (2014) demonstrates that this change in
policy allowed the percentage of ABS pledged to rise from 6% to 28%. Having seen
liquidity dry up in the covered bond market, ECB instituted the covered bond purchase
program (CBPP). The CBPP allowed the ECB to buy up eligible covered bonds5 up to
€60 billion to provide needed liquidity into a crucial market for bank funding. Rixtel and
Gasperini (2013) show that in December 2011 Germany re-activated a governmentguaranteed bond issuance program6. All of these demonstrated an increase in LLR
functions. The ECB and the German central bank realized the crisis was more farreaching than the panics Bagehot analyzed and responded by taking more unorthodox
actions to provide liquidity to their banks.

5

A covered bond is a bond backed by either mortgages or public sector loans
The government guaranteed payment of interest and principal of private bonds in case
the original bond issuer became insolvent or defaulted
6
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The Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) provided by ECB and
explained in Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) were conducted in December 2011 and
February 2012 totaled around €1 trillion and provided alternatives to both short and longterm wholesale funding markets. Germany received €74 billion in LTRO funding from
ECB. While the LTRO is not considered traditional ELA, it does function in a similar
matter. It provides an influx of credit for a longer than average period, three years rather
than several months, at a low interest rate with significantly reduced collateral
requirements. LTRO funds are available in unlimited quantities (full allotment) by
pledging a growing list of collateral to either the ECB or the home country’s central
bank. The interest rate available on the LTRO loans is based on the average of the
overnight rate during the loan period but fell to as low as 1% during February 2012.
Following Bagehot’s rules for LLRs, I believe he would disapprove of ECB’s
LTRO program. The ECB and subsequently Germany’s Bundesanstalt für
Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FMSA), central bank for financial market stabilization, did an
unquestionably good job of providing easily available credit to all those who asked. They
followed Bagehot’s (1873) advice that “every gentleman who came here with adequate
security was liberally dealt with” and “The Bank of England agrees to give other banks
the requisite assistance in case of need, and the other banks agree to ask for it” but the
ECB struggled with making funds readily available. The “full allotment” commitment of
LTRO successfully satisfies the idea of easily available credit to all those who
ask. Using Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung, Special Financial Market
Stabilization Funds (SoFFin), the institution set up to provide liquidity assistance for
German banks; assistance is available provided an institution satisfies ten well advertised
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criteria. Many banks did and SoFFin provided up to €530.8 billion in liquidity assistance
from its creation in 2011 to mid-2015 (SoFFin 2015). Bagehot (1873) recommends, “in a
panic the holders of the ultimate Bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to
all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily”. The freely and readily seem to
be satisfied. Funds were also made available quickly, banks seeking SoFFin funds were
approved using a computerized process to match firms with the announced criteria.
ECB funding however was much more of a process. As Götz et al (2015)
explain, ECB funding is “intertwined with the decision at the higher level. Political
and/or fiscal decision leading to a financial rescue of a sovereign indirectly also lead to
the maintained solvency of its banks”. Because ECB funding requires approval from
ECB’s Council of Governors, the process is immediately elongated and instantly
politicized. Instead of being a pure evaluation of solvency and liquidity requirements,
ELA approval is now tied to approval of the country’s government and policies. This
extra step blatantly violates Bagehot’s recommendation for quickly available funds.
While in practice all LTRO funds were covered by collateral, the widespread
nature of the 2008 Financial Crisis and subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis made
determining illiquidity versus insolvency extremely difficult. Banks may have originally
been only illiquid but as the crisis continued to unfold they became insolvent. ECB and
FMSA drastically increased their list of acceptable collateral past what Bagehot (1873)
describes as “in ordinary times is reckoned a good security”. Quickly ABS were a
significant portion of collateral put up to receive ECB funds and FMSA provided “Winddown Agencies” for banks to unload “non-performing” assets and unload risk in
exchange for available liquidity. Bagehot’s recommendations for LLRs are meant to
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avoid potential losses from provided ELA and both ECB and FMSA have opened
themselves up to potential losses.
FMSA provided a significant amount of credit to Commerzbank, originally €8.2
billion from SoFFin followed by another €15 billion in guarantees and eventually another
€10 billion in capital and a 25% plus one takeover by SoFFin (Brown 2009). In total
Germany provided €33.2 billion in credit and liquidity assistance to Commerzbank but it
was still not enough to avoid a takeover and buyout by the public. According to
Bagehot’s two rules: liquidity assistance should be made at a high interest rate and that it
should be supported by good collateral, Commerzbank succeeds in theory but
unfortunately due to its place in the world economy, it is trapped by the high interest rate
and the deterioration of its collateral.
While the original €8.2 billion in SoFFin liquidity was first provided at an 8.5%
interest rate and then lowered to a 5.5% interest rate, Commerzbank required more
liquidity assistance as time wore on and seemed to go from illiquid to insolvent. As time
passed and more losses on Commerzbank’s books became apparent the net worth of
Commerzbank tanked, the total value of the stock market capitalization of the bank fell to
€4 billion (nearly a quarter of the total government assistance). Expecting Commerzbank
to repay the total debt plus 8.5% interest while the bank’s value is falling and it is not
making a profit seems illogical. Commerzbank suffered a loss of €716 million in the
fourth quarter of 2012 and went multiple years without paying dividends to its
stockholders. Commerzbank worked hard to raise capital, mostly through issuing new
stock to existing shareholders in an effort to quickly pay back the German central bank
and show strength. However, still being unable to pay shareholders easily demonstrates
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that Commerzbank is still working towards full recovery years after receiving liquidity
assistance.
SoFFin attempted to lower the interest rate it charged Commerzbank as the crisis
went on, the original €8.2 was divided into two €4.1 billion trances the first with an 8.5%
interest rate and the second with a 5.5% interest rate. Those rates are enormously high as
banks worldwide faced liquidity problems. SoFFin succeeded in penalizing
Commerzbank for needing liquidity assistance and very probably dissuaded banks from
requesting ELA but the high interest rates forced Commerzbank to focus on repaying the
loans as quickly as possible rather than rebuilding its business to be profitable
again. Commerzbank was also forced to return to SoFFin multiple times for more ELA
of differing types begging the counterfactual of what would have happened if the interest
rate provided for the ELA had been more manageable.
It is probably safe to assume that the collateral provided by Commerzbank would
not have been accepted during ordinary times, as Bagehot recommends. ECB and FMSA
increased their list of acceptable collateral because they realized that needy banks would
be unable to provide the typical collateral. When bank needs as much ELA as
Commerzbank did, they have a number of underperforming assets on their books. These
underperforming assets would not be usable as collateral in an ordinary time. As this
Crisis continued to unfold and Europe faced its own Crisis simultaneously more assets
became unacceptable in ordinary times. SoFFin also considered banks on more facets
than the available collateral; business strategy, use of funds received, remuneration of
management, employees, etc., capital adequacy, dividend payments, time period,
measures to foster competition, fund accountability and other provisions decided by the
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supervising body. This holistic approach is presumably to give a chance for banks that
are facing a collateral crunch on top of the liquidity crunch.
Commerzbank required more than one round of ELA from SoFFin and FMSA
and the eventual takeover meant that Commerzbank became insolvent yet Germany
continued to provide them with liquidity assistance. This is a clear violation of Bagehot’s
biggest point, never lend at a loss. As a bank requires more and more rounds of ELA it
demonstrates that the situation is worse than originally anticipated or presented. A bank
that only requires one round of ELA is probably only suffering from a small liquidity
crisis or has realized that they are now insolvent and are following Bagehot’s assumed
separating equilibrium and taking themselves out of the game. A bank that needs more
than one round has a growing need for liquidity, meaning they either lied in the first
round because they were weary of being approved for the full amount needed, or their
situation grew more dire as time went on leading them closer and closer to
insolvency. Commerzbank required three separate capital influxes and was still so
insolvent it needed a government takeover. As Commerzbank became progressively
more illiquid and insolvent they should have taken themselves out of the running for
more ELA.
SoFFin should have also realized that Commerzbank was sinking and not exposed
themselves to that risk. It seems that they both suffered from an “in for a penny, in for a
pound mentality”: the more liquidity assistance provided to Commerzbank the more
SoFFin is tied to Commerzbank’s success. Once the original credit was dispersed,
SoFFin looks bad if they provided assistance to a bank that subsequently failed. For
appearances sake, SoFFin is motivated to ensure that every bank they approve for
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liquidity assistance originally becomes and remains solvent to avoid further panic in the
economy. While this should mean that SoFFin screens every institution applying for
ELA very carefully and selectively approves funds, the dilemma of systemically
important banks becomes relevant again.
According to Bagehot, SoFFin and FMSA should only provide funding to banks
that can demonstrate they are solvent but illiquid without regard to how that will affect
SoFFin and FMSA’s image. Bagehot’s standards mean that by providing lots of liquidity
to anyone who asks and is able to provide proper collateral, FMSA and SoFFin would be
able to avoid further panic. But Bagehot’s plan to avoid a panic did not include
systemically important banks. As it stands now, SoFFin and FMSA could do exactly as
Bagehot asks but a greater panic could follow the failure of Commerzbank than a panic
where Commerzbank is funneled undeserved liquidity assistance. Central banks in other
countries have followed his advice, but when Lehman Brothers failed the consequences
of that decision were felt worldwide. ELA is supposed to boost the confidence in an
institution, it is supposed to show the public that the government has faith in the bank so
everyone else should also. But if a bank is now considered “too big to fail”, receiving
ELA can have the opposite effect. That action now signals to the public that something is
amiss within that institution. Instead of showing confidence in the security and solvency
of a bank, giving ELA to a bank now shows concern for the wellbeing of the bank and
may be followed by a takeover or run on the bank.
The third case is that of Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) and the state of
Bavaria. BayernLB received €15.3 billion in guarantees from SoFFin from year end
2008 to year-end 2011 (SoFFin 2015). In addition to these funds, BayernLB also
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received €10 billion in capital and a €4.8 billion risk shield from the Bavarian
government (Bloomberg 2012). All of the ELA received by BayernLB and other similar
Landesbanks has led to a discussion on the relevance of Landesbanks
currently. BayernLB received over €30 billion in assistance from national and regional
authorities and it was subject to a public bailout to ensure its survival in the
future. BayernLB failed to provide good banking securities, but the lawmakers and
taxpayers of Bavaria succeeding in providing easily accessible liquidity when
asked. SoFFin also failed to avoid lending at a loss in this situation, the €15.3 billion in
guarantees were given at market price rather than the actual value of asset at present time.
The interest SoFFin took for their guarantees fell between .5% and 2% (FMSA
2010). This seems like a much more reasonable interest rate to charge banks that are
facing a liquidity crisis than the rate charged to Commerzbank, but BayernLB asked for a
different type of assistance from SoFFin. While Commerzbank needed recapitalization,
BayernLB only needed a guarantee for debt securities. A major part of this assistance
meant that SoFFin accepted various securities from BayernLB and provided BayernLB
with an amount of liquid capital equivalent to the amount of non-liquid securities they
traded in. This functions less like a loan and more like a payment-in-kind. This allows
SoFFin to charge a much lower interest rate rather than a traditional recapitalization
loan. However, an additional 2% on €15.3 billion (€306 million) is a sizeable required
interest payment and would theoretically act like a penalty rate as Bagehot advises.
The guarantees provided to BayernLB were done on the promise of “an adequate
capital base” which BayernLB was able to produce. Many institutions had billions of
dollars of securities they were willing to put up for guarantees. Receiving a guarantee on
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an asset that is underperforming functions like free money. BayernLB had a large stake
in the mortgage-backed securities market and as the floor continued to fall out of that
market, having SoFFin provide a guarantee at face value rather than market value was an
enormous capital injection. Truthfully, BayernLB did provide a lot of capital to receive a
guarantee upon, but SoFFin’s decision to provide a guarantee on the face value of the
securities rather than the market value of the asset eliminates the idea of an “adequate
capital base”. If BayernLB can provide a portfolio full of assets with face values over
€15 billion and receive that large of a guarantee even if the market value is significantly
lower than that, what is the point of requiring collateral at all?
More alarmingly, guaranteeing face value of a security opens SoFFin up to major
losses. Underperforming assets of this magnitude are not going to suddenly turn around
and become well performing assets. Even if the guarantee is being provided at a
moderate rate of interest for three to five years, mortgage-backed securities will never be
worth the face value they had just before the bubble burst. At best SoFFin can hope to
break even on the guarantees because of the interest, realistically they lent with the
anticipation of a loss. This is a clear violation of Bagehot’s recommendations.
Given BayernLB’s ability to receive funds from the taxpayers of Bavaria also
reduces the need to apply for SoFFin funding and meet their standards. Previous to the
Financial Crisis BayernLB was still majority owned by the state of Bavaria, this unique
Landesbank relationship means that the Bavarian government has a controlling stake in
BayernLB. The controlling stake requires that the government of Bavaria be held
ultimately responsible for the actions of BayernLB. The assumption of the separating
equilibrium was again violated in this case. BayernLB is such a large part of this
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economy that the incentives for BayernLB to remain solvent are very large and present
for the bank and the state. Bavaria is such a large and wealthy state that the failing of its
Landesbank would signal that the entire economy of that state is failing. By propping up
its Landesbank Bavaria shows Germany, and the world as a whole, that Landesbanks and
BayernLB in particular are still relevant, important and functional. All executives in
BayernLB want that to be demonstrated to the public, they want to keep their jobs. The
state of Bavaria is invested in keeping regional control of their bank, and too large a
bailout from SoFFin would not allow that to happen. By providing a large amount of
credit on whatever collateral was available lets the state of Bavaria keep such large
control over their Landesbank and signals to the rest of the world that Bavaria and
Germany are doing fine. Having to divulge that the bank you as a state regulate and
manage is insolvent eliminates all faith that the people of Bavaria have in their
lawmakers and could easily mean the lawmakers are out of a job. Both groups meant to
regulate the dealings of BayernLB are invested in keeping up appearances as long as
possible.
While the lawmakers of Bavaria did ensure that funds were easily available to
BayernLB, they did not seem to assess whether the funds should be provided. Given the
size of BayernLB and its importance to the economy of Bavaria, providing liquidity
assistance seemed like an effective way to prevent a panic. By providing assistance from
the state rather than the nation lawmakers ensured they would retain control of the
Landesbank and it displays an image of control. BayernLB was critically important to
the lawmakers of Bavaria and they were unwilling to let it be taken away from them
either through a national takeover or a failure of the bank.
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If BayernLB did require a large amount of financial assistance from the central
government it would demonstrate that the financial situation in the bank was more dire
than anticipated and would reflect poorly on the lawmakers and the state of Bavaria as a
whole. The more dismal the situation appears to the outside world, the more likely
BayernLB is to receive help from SoFFin or FMSA and the more likely the lawmakers of
Bavaria are to lose their jobs (just look at Greece’s rolling government roster). A
separating equilibrium cannot hold in this situation, parties have too much to lose by
being truthful and facing the consequences.
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IV. Data Analysis
The conclusions regarding stigma and a separating equilibrium raised earlier encouraged
further investigation. In the financial world, a firm’s stock price represents the public’s
trust in the company. Using simple laws of supply and demand, as public trust in the
company or firm increases demand for the stock of that company rises and the stock price
rises accordingly. The same works in reverse: lack of trust leads to a decrease in demand
and a fall in the stock price. The analysis presented earlier in the paper led to the
conclusion that the systemically important banks receipt of ELA would erode public
confidence and therefore lower the rate of return on holding stock more than can be
explained by typical market variance.
As explained earlier, “ELA is supposed to boost the confidence in an institution,
it’s supposed to show the public that the government has faith in the bank so everyone
else should also...That action [receiving ELA] now signals to the public that something is
amiss within that institution”. As this paper focuses on two institutions--Commerzbank
and BayernLB--it would be ideal to test this assumption for both banks but unfortunately
BayernLB’s status as a Landesbank means there is no publically available stock
price. Commerzbank however, is a publically traded company and the data is available
for it. To restate, the conclusion or hypothesis being tested empirically is:
Commerzbank’s status as a systemically important bank means the massive amounts of
ELA received by Commerzbank should have provided an excess of public distrust in
Commerzbank.
The excess public distrust would have shown up as an otherwise unexplained
change in the rate of return for the bank’s closing stock price. I will therefore conduct an
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event study. The Fama/French 3 factor model is used to capture more explained variance
than the traditional CAPM model. The factor considered for above market returns with
CAPM is the riskiness of a stock or asset. The augmented Fama/French model used here
incorporates three additional factors: Small Minus Large (SMB), High Minus Low
(HML) and, Winner Minus Loser (WML) (Brückner et al., 2014). Small Minus Big
represents the difference in rates of return for firms with small market capitalization and
the rates of return for firms with large market capitalization. The breakpoints for “small”
and “big” firms were the median of the entire portfolio. High Minus Low represents the
difference in rates of return for high value stocks and rates of return for low value, or
growth, stocks. Winner Minus Loser represents a momentum factor; winners tend to
keep winning, rising stocks continue to rise, and losers tend to keep losing, falling stocks
continue to fall. WML is the difference between the rate of returns for winning stocks
and the rate of returns for losing stocks. In order to capture variance in the total German
market the rate of return for closing prices in Volkswagen stock was included. Including
all of those variables my equation looks like the following:
RC-Rf= α +β1 [Rm-Rf]+β2 SMB+β3 HML+β4 WML+β5 RV+Ɛ
In this model Rc-Rf represents the rate of return for Commerzbank minus the risk-free
rate of return, this difference represents the profitable return to holding Commerzbank
stock. α is the constant. Rm-Rf is the market rate of return minus the risk-free rate of
return; this difference represents the profitability of holding the market portfolio. Rv is
the rate of return for Volkswagen and Ɛ is the error term.
The focus is on the public’s response to the announcement of Commerzbank’s
receipt of ELA funds. This happened on three separate dates: November 3rd, 2008;
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January 8th, 2009 and; December 14th, 2011. The closeness of the first two dates reflects
the chaos happening in the international banking and finance sectors during the beginning
of the crisis while the distance from the third date gave the German public and the
international community a lot of time to process what had happened and what
Commerzbank’s role in the crisis was.
The important nature of bailout announcements necessitates confidentiality until
the official public statement is made, but given the potential for gain if one knew the
information ahead of time it is likely that information was leaked. This information
would be leaked to those most likely to take advantage of it, such as other higher ups in
the financial or banking sector. That should be reflected by an unexplained decrease in
the stock prices because demand for Commerzbank would fall. To accommodate this the
regression was run four weeks ahead of the announcement, one week ahead of the
announcement and on the day the announcement was officially made. Incorporating all
of this information, the unexplained change should be highest one week out from the
announcement (the decision for a bailout has been made and information has likely been
disseminated to other people in power) for each bailout and overall for the third bailout
(the time between the first two bailouts and the third bailout allowed time for public
distrust to brew).
The coefficient of most importance is β4. This is the beta in front of the
momentum factor WML. If receiving ELA is being met with a stigma and public distrust
that would make Commerzbank a losing firm. As losing firms continue to lose, the β in
front of momentum should be negative, and large. The momentum of losing will
perpetuate more losing and decrease profitable returns to Commerzbank.
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The data set being used included the following variables: the daily market rate of
return provided by Brückner et al., the daily yield on the short term German bond, the
rate of returns for the daily closing stock prices for Commerzbank and Volkswagen,
adjusted for dividends, and the augmented German Fama/French factors (SMB, HML,
and WML). The dates of the data set are from January 3rd, 2000 until December 30th,
2011. The daily returns are consistent and without holes, except for the major bank
holiday from July 28th to August 18th, 2008. For consistency, all variables’ differences
were summed during that period.
Unfortunately for all of the regressions there is a lack of significant results. The
highest r-squared term is 0.0032 for one week out from the first announcement, October
27th, 2008 (Table 1). As shown on the included table of results, the only significant
coefficient is for the rate of return for the Volkswagen stock and it is only significant at
the 10% level. Having such a low r-squared term in fact speaks to the lack of relationship
between any of the variables, except between Commerzbank and Volkswagen. This
relationship makes sense because both companies are predominantly affected by
developments on the German stock market. Unsurprisingly the coefficient on the
Volkswagen rate of return is positive, as both Commerzbank and Volkswagen are large
multinational German firms so as one does well the other will benefit. If Volkswagen has
record sales, that increases confidence in the entire German market and that is reflected in
an increase in confidence for Commerzbank. Additionally, neither the augmented
Fama/French variables nor the excess risk of the market bear any relationship to
Commerzbank.
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Table 1. Excess returns to Commerzbank daily stock holdings
Explanatory Variable
Profitable returns to the Market Portfolio (Rm-Rf)
Size (SMB)
Volume (HML)
Momentum (WML)
Volkswagen Rate of Return (Rv)
Constant (α)

Coefficient
- 0.0506
(0.1072)
0.1027
(0.1150)
0.0622
(0.0789)
0.0068
(0.0581)
0.0649*
(0.0369)
0.0851
(0.0579)

Notes:
N= 2281
R2= 0.0032
*Statistical significance at 10%
Standard errors are in parentheses

As the data being used is a time-series, the Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey
tests were run to detect possible autocorrelation. While the Durbin-Watson test did not
indicate autocorrelation, the Breusch-Godfrey test did so the regression was corrected
with Newey-West standard errors. The results of that regression are below (Table 2) but
they further demonstrate the lack of significance problem; there are no longer any
significant variables.
Table 2. Excess returns to Commerzbank daily stock holdings corrected for
autocorrelation
Explanatory Variable
Profitable returns to the Market Portfolio (Rm-Rf)
Size (SMB)
Volume (HML)

Coefficient
-0.0506
(0.1021)
0.1027
(0.1064)
0.0622
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Volkswagen Rate of Return (Rv)
Constant (α)
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(0.0650)
0.0067
(0.0512)
0.0649
(0.0423)
0.0851
(0.0591)

Notes:
N= 2281
F-stat= 1.62
df= 5, 2275
p-value= 0.1516
Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses

These results do not support the hypothesis stated above. One cannot draw
conclusions about anything in this regression because of the insignificance of all
variables included. Instead of being able to easily infer the presence of a quantifiable
potential stigma of receiving ELA funds in this instance, no substantial conclusions can
be drawn. While the number of observations included in this regression is high, the
regression is only focused on one particular institution.
The literary analysis given earlier focuses on three case studies meant to
exemplify how Bagehot’s rules have failed in the new environment of systemically
important banks. While ideally this regression would have demonstrated an unexpected
stigma, the lack of any results does not definitively disprove the existence of a
stigma. There is still a high possibility that the stigma is included in the large
unexplained portion however, the lack of significance makes drawing any conclusions
about the size and force of the stigma impossible. Rather the non-relationship
demonstrated in this instance does not conclusively signal anything.
It should be made clear that this does not mean that there was no change in stock
prices as when the bailouts were announced, stock prices changed -12.38%, +12.42%

German ELA in Crisis

Gillenwater 41

and -6.25% on each bailout announcement date; rather the variables chosen in this
particular regression hold no clues for explanation. A number of other opinions and
variables could, and probably do, hold the keys for understanding. For example;
perceptions of bank stock may have been very skewed during this time, regulatory
changes may have been more important, the amount of the bailouts could have been very
important, et cetera.
As the Financial Crisis deepened it became clear that banks and financial
institutions were receiving a special treatment not seen before. The panic and confusion
that grew out of the failure of Lehman Brothers paralyzed so many regulators and
politicians from allowing many other institutions to fail. While regular business were
still allowed to fail and not guaranteed receipt of any emergency funds, banks were not
turned away and LLRs kept finding new ways to provide banks with funding. As banks,
and particularly systemically important banks, were receiving special treatment, it
logically follows that bank stock should receive special perceptions.
The EU’s unique financial situation kept numerous countries informed of the
regulations being imposed on other banks. Access to ELA funds required unanimous
approval of the Board of Governors so countries seeking ELA for their banks would have
disclosed how they were changing or regulating their banks. The EU environment
provided an arena for direct comparison between countries. As such, the regulatory
changes for Germany (as the financial powerhouse of the EU) would have been very
important for investors in German banks. If the banking and regulatory environment was
drastically changing the international community would have been very interested.
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The definition of Commerzbank as a systemically important bank has never been
disputed, it remains Germany’s second largest private bank. After the fall of Lehman
Brothers people began to use the phrases “systemically important” or “too big to
fail”. Securing a bailout for a large bank was no longer in contention. What was still up
for discussion became the amount and makeup of the bailout: would it be a straight loan?
Would it be through the government buying shares? Would it be a guarantee? Or of
another form yet unseen? That uncertainty, as does any uncertainty, strains the markets
and the price of stocks. These are just three examples of other variables not included that
may explain the change in the price of Commerzbank stock, but because they were not a
part of the regression stated above, again there are no conclusions that can be drawn.
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V. Conclusion
While Germany and its financial institutions may never face the public scrutiny that other
countries, banks and emergency funds have faced, we now know Germany required ELA
and dispersed it ineffectively. Walter Bagehot’s recommendations provide a consistent
baseline for judgment no matter the scale of the crisis. He does not take scope or amount
given into consideration, making his advice easily applicable to modern problems. His
three pieces of advice: lend freely to all who ask and can provide adequate collateral, at a
high penalty rate and, avoid lending at a loss, should still apply today. Bagehot’s
separating equilibrium is critical to his recommendations but seems to no longer apply in
today’s situations. A separating equilibrium assumes that a situation is static and that all
players will not try to beat the game. While bankers in nineteenth century England may
have acted in the same manner, European countries and banks definitely violated those
assumptions.
All institutions that find themselves in the LLR position are invested in the
continued strength and solvency of the financial sector and should be doing everything
they can to protect it. Following the 2008 Financial Crisis and the subsequent Sovereign
Debt Crisis, the ECB found itself in that position. Following Bagehot’s
recommendations would mean that the ECB lent easily and freely to all those who asked
at a high interest rate provided they gave substantial collateral. As the crises deepened,
the types of collateral that were accepted grew and the types of liquidity assistance
evolved and expanded. The penalty rate was not consistently charged, the interest rates
on LTROs fell to one percent at one point. The ECB accepted the collateral at above
market prices for many securities, especially ABS, and effectively lent at a loss.
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Within Germany, the central bank did not do a stellar job following Bagehot’s
advice. FMSA and SoFFin provided substantial liquidity assistance to Commerzbank. In
total €33.2 billion was provided, but Commerzbank still required a government
takeover. Commerzbank provided evidence of being insolvent rather than illiquid but
SoFFin either ignored the evidence or did not recognize the evidence and eventually
confirmed its insolvent status by taking it over. The insolvency guarantees that SoFFin
lent at a loss, Bagehot’s biggest concern. It also demonstrates that the interest rate
charged by SoFFin was not in fact a penalty rate, Commerzbank should have failed from
the beginning (if the situation was static) or when they became insolvent (if the situation
changed over time) because they were insolvent rather than string ECB and the German
taxpayers along.
BayernLB and the state of Bavaria fared fairly similarly. SoFFin and FMSA
failed to provide a penalty rate that successfully ensured a separating equilibrium would
hold. While BayernLB did provide some form of collateral, SoFFin provided their
guarantees at face value and the lawmakers of Bavaria were eager to provide funds to
ensure that BayernLB remained in Bavarian control. Both of these actions opened up the
German and Bavarian governments to losses, in strict violation of Bagehot’s
recommendations.
Empirically, however, Commerzbank fared a little bit better. The hypothesis of
Commerzbank having lots of public distrust cannot be confirmed. The overall lack of a
relationship between the augmented Fama/French factors and Commerzbank encourages
further investigation. I conclude my data analysis with a few variables that may explain
the non-relationship, a regression including those variables is the logical next step. If the
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regression including the additional proposed variables has more significant results, the
size of the public stigma and distrust can be more accurately predicted. As nothing has
been definitively proven, or disproven, there is still plenty of empirical work that could
follow the investigation and analysis of systemically important banks.
The limitations of my research came primarily from lack of data
availability. Receiving ELA comes with a stigma and a connotation of financial
insecurity. The continuous violations of Bagehot’s separating equilibrium eliminate the
possibility of a bank being seen as solvent when receiving ELA. When Bagehot wrote in
1873, ELA could be seen as a signal of solvency because a bank that was willing to
undertake a loan at the penalty rate had the funds to be able to repay the loan at a later
date. Now however, the incentives to follow a separating equilibrium and remain truthful
when asking for ELA have changed so drastically that receiving ELA is now a signal for
insolvency.
Banks, both public and private, are unlikely to make that information easily
available until the stigma is eliminated and trust in institutions applying for ELA
recovers. As it stands now, the culture around ELA seems unlikely to change. Greece’s
continued request for more liquidity assistance is still shrouded in some secrecy despite
all the international news coverage. Unfortunately, in order to update the
recommendations for LLRs in current times it is imperative that this information becomes
more easily available. Creating generalizations and recommendations for what the LLR
functions should be and how ELA should be dispersed becomes more accurate and
realistic when there is more available data to test.
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This research lends itself to the further development of LLRs and the theory
behind their actions. While Bagehot’s recommendations continue to be an important
starting point for analyzing whether LLRs are effectively completing their tasks, the 2008
global Financial Crisis and Europe’s subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis have alerted us of
how dependent and connected the world economy is. If systemically important financial
institutions continue to be “too big to fail”, the expectations for LLRs must be
updated. Besides the problem of moral hazard from nearly guaranteed ELA availability,
the penalty rate becomes pointless. Systemically important institutions will receive ELA
whether they are illiquid or insolvent and the assuming separating equilibrium will never
hold. Additionally, ensuring ELA is available to “too big to fail” banks requires
accepting collateral that is often substandard because that is what is available and opens
the LLR to potentially lending at a loss.
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